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MARYLAND UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1989, Maryland became the twenty-ninth' state to
adopt the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (the Act).2 The basic function
of the Act is to codify and clarify the existing common law of trade
secrets,' and to minimize substantive differences among the adopt-
ing states by expressly requiring uniform construction.4 In an area
that frequently involves interstate transactions with their attendant
conflict of laws problems, the Act brings needed predictability to
trade secrets law5 and a means by which to incorporate a broad base
of case law. This Note provides an overview of the Act's contours,
and the ways in which its adoption is likely to change the treatment
of trade secrets in Maryland.
1. For other enactments of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (the Act), see ALA. CODE
§§ 8-27-1 to -6 (Supp. 1989); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.910 to .945 (1989); CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 3426-3426.10 (West Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-74-101 to -110 (1987);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-50 to -58 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001 to 2009 (Supp.
1988); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-501 to -510 (Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. §§ 688.001 to .009
(Supp. 1990); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 482B-1 to -9 (Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140,
paras. 351-359 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-2-3-1 to -8 (Burns
Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3320 to -3330 (1983 & Supp. 1989); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 51:1431 to :1439 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1541-1548
(Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.01 to .08 (1981 & Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 30-14-401 to -409 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 600A.010 to .100 (Supp. 1989); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 350-B:1 to :9 (Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3A-1 to -7 (Supp.
1989); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-25.1-01 to -08 (Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78,
§§ 85-95 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.461 to .475 (1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-
41-1 to -11 (Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 37-29-1 to -11 (Supp. 1989);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-24-1 to -9 (Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-336 to -343
(1987); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.108.010 to .940 (1989); W. VA. CODE §§ 47-22-1 to -10
(1986); Wis. STAT. § 134.90 (1989).
2. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 537-38 commissioners' prefatory note
(1980). The Act is codified in Maryland at MD. CoM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 11-1201 to -
1209 (1989). The legislature's sole substantive change to the Uniform Act was to add a
provision, id., § 11-207(2), indicating that the statute does not impose liability on state
personnel beyond that allowed by the Maryland Tort Claims Act. See MD. STATE GOV'T
CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 to 12-110 (1984 & Supp. 1989).
3. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 370 commissioners' prefatory note (Supp.
1985).
4. See MD. CoM. LAw CODE ANN. § 11-1208 (1989); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS
ACT § 8, 14 U.L.A. 387 (1980).
5. See Klitzke, The Uniforn Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277, 282-84 (1980); see,
e.g., Rhoads & Sons, Inc. v. Ammeraal, Inc., No. 83C-NO-98, slip. op. at 11-12 (Del.
Super. Ct., Oct. 21, 1988) (Del. LEXIS 395) (relying on Indiana's construction of the
Act's purpose to resolve conflict of laws issues).
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Under the Act's definition, trade secret protection apparently
applies to a somewhat broader range of information than under the
common law.6 Further, the Act reconciles conflicting common-law
views among the adopting jurisdictions on the remedies available to
one whose trade secret has been misappropriated. 7 The Act also
should eliminate confusion over statute of limitations problems in
the litigation of trade secret protection.'
I. THE NATURE OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
Unlike information protected by federal patents,9 trade
secrets' ° do not enjoy absolute monopoly protection, either at com-
mon law or under the Act. The holder of a trade secret does not
apply to the government for protection, as with a patent. Rather,
one secures trade secret protection through private efforts to main-
tain secrecy. One's rights in trade secrets give rise to legal and equi-
table remedies under state law only in the event of
"4 misappropriation,"" a term defined liberally by the Act. Misap-
propriation can come about either by tortious conduct, or by the
breach of a confidential relationship.i It is the combination of an
existing trade secret and "misappropriation" which gives rise to a
cause of action; neither will suffice independently.Is
In contrast to a patent holder, the trade secret holder has no
rights against a competitor who discovers the secret indepen-
dently,' 4 or through reverse engineering. 5 In addition, protection
6. See infra notes 29-64 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
8. Limitations problems arise in this context for two reasons. Continuing misap-
propriations present the problem of determining when the statute began to run. This
problem is compounded by the fact that at least three major theories were available at
common law on which to base a trade secret action-property, tort, and quasi-contract.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT, 14 U.L.A. 370 commissioners' prefatory note (Supp. 1985).
9. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-104 (1982).
10. For the definition of trade secret, see infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
11. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-1201(c) (1989).
12. See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 897
(Minn. 1983) (en banc) (holding that to allow a remedy for misappropriation without the
proper finding of a trade secret would "come dangerously close to expanding the trade
secrets act into a catchall for industrial torts").
14. I&
15. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). Several of the
adopting states expressly have excepted reverse engineering, i.e., the discovery of opera-
tional principles by examination of a rightfidly acquired sample, and development in-
dependent from the 'improper means' concept. See, e.g., I.. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, para.
352 § 2(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.461(1) (1988). For the defi-
nition and scope of 'improper means,' see infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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exists only as long as the trade secret, in fact, is kept "secret."16
Public disclosure,' 7 or a failure to exercise reasonable care to main-
tain secrecy, will result either in a complete loss of protection' 8 or in
a finding that a trade secret never existed.'9 Trade secret protec-
tion, therefore, differs from patent protection in that the former is
continuously dependent on the conduct of both the alleged misap-
propriator and the creator, rather than on the combination of the
protected subject matter and the government's explicit recognition
of the right.
If the monopoly protection that the federal and state govern-
ments afford patents is so much more comprehensive, as well as im-
possible to lose by an owner's inadvertent action, why would anyone
ever prefer trade secret protection to patent protection? First, trade
secret protection may be the only protection available. To qualify as
a trade secret, information need not meet the stringent tests re-
quired for issuance of a patent. The subject matter of a trade secret
need not be "novel" 2 ° or "nonobvious," ' 2 ' nor must it be an "inven-
tion" or "discovery." '22 Yet, even if the information does meet these
16. See infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
17. The trade secret is not lost when a confidential relationship is created at the
point of "disclosure." For example, computer software shrink wrap agreements cause
such a relationship to be created by the very conduct (opening the wrapper) that works
the disclosure. See Kemp, Mass Marketed Software: The Legality of the Form License Agreement,
48 LA. L. REV. 87, 116 (1987); Note, The Enforceability of State "Shrink-Wrap" License Stat-
utes in Light of Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 74 CORNELL L. REV. 222, 229 n.52
(1988).
18. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971, 980-81 (1989)
(holding that a state law which interferes with the enjoyment of an unpatented utilitarian
or design conception that its author has disclosed freely to the public-at-large impermis-
sibly contravenes the federal patent policy's ultimate goal of public disclosure); Miller v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 47, 48 (D. Md. 1975) (holding that compensa-
tion is not warranted if the accused misappropriator had prior knowledge of facts before
they were disclosed to him in confidence).
19. See, e.g., Dworkin v. Blumenthal, 77 Md. App. 774, 781-82, 551 A.2d 947, 950-51
(1989) (holding that a professional association's patient list compiled by dentists prior to
their resignation was not a trade secret absent evidence that the association expended an
extraordinary amount of effort or money to generate the list and in view of the ready
availability and use of that information by others involved in the practice).
20. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974). As the Court
pointed out, however, the fact of secrecy itself implies some degree of novelty. Id at
476.
21. Id. at 483.
22. Id. But cf. Klitzke, supra note 5, at 282 & n.7. Klitzke maintains that information
must qualify as a discovery to warrant trade secret protection. Id. The cases cited for
this proposition, however, predate the Act significandy and at best represent a bygone
conflict among the jurisdictions. While "discoveries" are surely the usual candidates for
trade secret protection, even prior to the Act the common law extended protection to
many more categories of information than properly could be called "discoveries." See
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tests, the government will grant a patent only if the information falls
within one of the statutorily enumerated categories.2" Second, issu-
ance of a patent can take several years. Today, it is quite possible
that the invention which the creator seeks to protect will become
obsolete before patent protection attaches. 24 Trade secret protec-
tion, by contrast, attaches immediately, automatically, and continu-
ously. Third, an element of risk exists in the patent application
process. Although a patent provides monopoly rights against the
world, such rights are justified on public policy grounds only by the
requirement that the creator make public the patented invention.25
Therefore, the creator's idea will remain in the public domain with-
out protection if a court denies a patent's validity after issuance.26
Fourth, patents confer monopoly rights of limited duration, 27
whereas rights in a trade secret persist as long as the holder main-
tains the requisite level of secrecy. 28
Atlantic Wool Combing Co. v. Norfolk Mills, Inc., 357 F.2d 866, 868 (1st Cir. 1966)
(reversing a lower court's determination that a minor change to a machine, not signifi-
cant enough to qualify as a discovery, was ineligible for trade secret protection; such a
view "unduly narrow[ed] the scope of trade secret protection."); see also Organic
Chems., Inc. v. Carroll Prods., Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 628, 630-31 (W.D. Mich. 1981)
(rejecting the discovery requirement in favor of the rule that "a 'trade secret' may be a
device or process which is anticipated in the prior art, or it may be clearly patentable.");
Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Md. 1958) (rejecting the discov-
ery requirement and holding that "[a] trade secret may consist of any formula or pat-
tern, any machine or process of manufacturing, or any device or compilation of
information used in one's business, and which may give to the user an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.").23. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The categories include "process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter ...." Id.
24. See, e.g., Drater, Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV.
887, 894.
25. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
26. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT, 14 U.L.A. 369 commissioners' prefatory note (Supp.
1985).
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
28. A striking example of the importance of continuing trade secret protection is the
maintenance, against fierce attack, of the trade secret status of the formula for Coca-
Cola. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cola-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288 (D. Del. 1985) discussed
the measures that the company took to keep the formula secret.
The written version of the secret formula is kept in a security vault at the Trust
Company Bank in Atlanta, and that vault can only be opened by a resolution
from the Company's Board of Directors. It is the Company's policy that only
two persons in the Company shall know the formula at any one time, and that
only those persons may oversee the actual preparation of Merchandise 7X.
The Company refuses to allow the identity of those persons to be disclosed
or to allow those persons to fly on the same airplane at the same time.
Id. at 294.
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II. DETERMINATION OF A TRADE SECRET UNDER MARYLAND'S
COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE ACT
The policy that underlies trade secrets law is the "maintenance
of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention."29 To
that end, Maryland adopted the Restatement of Torts' 30 trade secrets
doctrine in Space Aero Products Co. v. R.E. Darling Co. 31 Under that
view,
[a] trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device
or compilation of information which is used in one's busi-
ness, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an ad-
vantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It
may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of
manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern
for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.3 2
The Space Aero court also embraced33 the Restatement's litany of fac-
tors to be considered 4 in determining whether the information in a
particular case meets the requirements of a trade secret:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of
his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employ-
ees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of
measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the informa-
tion; (4) the value of the information to him and to his
competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended
by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or diffi-
culty with which the information could be properly ac-
29. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481.
30. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). The Restatement was the basis for the com-
mon law of trade secrets in nearly every state until 1980, when Minnesota became the
first state to adopt the Act. The American Law Institute eliminated the trade secrets
provisions from the 1979 edition of the Restatement after finding that trade secret law had
developed into a separate body of law no longer wholly dependent on tort law. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 1-2 introductory note (1979); see Klitzke, supra note 5, at
282-83.
31. 238 Md. 93, 105, 208 A.2d 74, 79, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965).
32. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
33. 238 Md. at 110, 208 A.2d at 82.
34. While the Maryland court used the phrase "factors to be considered," id., which
indicated a balancing test, other courts have looked upon these "factors" as "elements"
that form a conjunctive test to establish a trade secret's existence. See, e.g. Electro-Craft
Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983) (en banc). Although
the court decided Electro-Craft under the Act, it seems probable that the Act's widespread
adoption will serve to bring most, if not all, jurisdictions in line with Maryland's balanc-
ing approach. See, e.g., Minuteman, Inc. v. L. D. Alexander, 147 Wis. 2d 842, 851-53,
434 N.W.2d 773, 777 (1989) (rejecting Wisconsin's prior common-law interpretation of
the Restatement factors as a conjunctive test, in light of the Act's adoption).
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quired or duplicated by others.3 5
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act provides a new definition of
"trade secret," however, which supercedes the Restatement.3 6 Under
the Act:
'Trade Secret' means information, including a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique,
or process, that:
(1) Derives independent economic value, actual or poten-
tial, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use;
and
(2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.3 7
Clearly, this definition is based on the Restatement comment, yet
it contains at least one substantive difference that significantly
broadens the scope of trade secrets law. The common law required
that the purported trade secret be "used in [one's] business," and
provide "an advantage over competitors who do not know or use
it. '" Under the Act, this business requirement is absent and it is
unnecessary to show that one gains value from the competitors' lack
of knowledge.3 9
There are relatively few reported Maryland cases on the com-
mon law of trade secrets and, to date, no reported cases have been
litigated under the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act. But in
Conteka B. V. v. Union Carbide Corp. ,4" a case decided less than a year
before Maryland adopted the Act, this difference between the com-
35. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
36. The Restatement definition is embodied not only in the case law, but also in statu-
tory provisions. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 38A, § 8(4) (1986). The Maryland Act
expressly displaces, among other things, pre-existing tort law based on misappropria-
tion of trade secrets. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 11-1207(a) (1989). Therefore, the
statute pre-empts the Restatement definition of the nature of a trade secret, to the extent
that the Restatement presents a more restrictive view, whether through contradictory or
supplementary terms. As discussed infra in note 51 and the accompanying text, how-
ever, not all courts have maintained the separation between the Act and its common-law
antecedents.
37. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 11-1201(e) (1989).
38. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
39. See MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 11-1201(e) (1989). In many instances, the
holder of a purported trade secret will have no competitors, at least before the alleged
misappropriation. At common law, these facts very well could lead to a finding that no
trade secret existed at the time of the misappropriation. The Act eliminates this
anomaly.
40. 699 F. Supp. 77 (D. Md. 1988).
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mon-law and statutory definitions of trade secret was crucial, if not
determinative, to the outcome. 41 In Conteka, the court refused to
find error in jury instructions that used the term "trade secret" di-
rectly before the phrase "in one's business," stating that "[u]nder
Space Aero, use of an idea in business is an element of trade secret
protection. ' 42 Had the Act been in effect, the outcome of the case
might well have been different because the Act would have allowed
the jury to find a trade secret in the absence of a business
connection.
In fact, the Restatement definition of a trade secret required not
only business use, but continuous business use.43 Information used
for one-time purchases, such as contract bids, salary offers, and the
scheduled time for key announcements specifically was excluded
from coverage under section 757.44 Only section 759,45 which the
Maryland courts never had addressed, protected this information.
Under the Act, information is eligible for trade secret protection re-
gardless of the continuity of its use. The Act also broadens the com-
mon-law definition of trade secret by allowing information with
mere potential value, as opposed to present value, to qualify for
protection.46 Thus, a cause of action that previously would have
failed to establish liability under Maryland common law due to lack
of present value is viable under the Act.4 7
Maryland courts have paid particular attention to the fifth factor
of the Restatement test: the effort or expense that the creator in-
vested to develop the purported trade secret.4" Evidence aimed at
establishing this factor still may be relevant under the Act to show
41. Id. at 78-80 (court denied plaintiffs motion for a new trial on grounds that the
Maryland common law of trade secrets supported jury instructions).
42. Id. at 79-80.
43. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939). See generally Klitzke, supra note
5, at 284-90.
44. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
45. Id. § 759 ("PROcURING INFORMATION BY IMPROPER MEANS").
46. MD. CoM. LAw CODE ANN. § ll-1201(e)(l) (1989).
47. There are no Maryland cases rejecting a trade secret claim on the grounds that
the alleged secret had potential, but not present, value. However, Maryland case law
prior to the Act suggests that the trade secret must possess current actual value. See, e.g.,
supra note 35 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Dworkin v. Blumenthal, 77 Md. App. 774, 782, 551 A.2d 947, 950 (1989)
(lower court's finding that no trade secret existed in a dental association's patient list
was supported by lack of evidence that the association expended an extraordinary
amount of effort or money to generate the list); cf Tabs Assocs. v. Brohawn, 59 Md.
App. 330, 334, 345, 475 A.2d 1203, 1211, 1213 (1984) (prima facie showing of a pro-
tectable right in a trade secret was supported by evidence that $180,000 were expended
on an analysis of the process over a six year period).
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independent economic value.49 It is difficult to predict how the Act
will affect the courts' treatment of this and other vestiges of the Re-
statement test,50 but the degree to which the courts retain these Re-
statement factors will define the Act's future importance in expanding
protection.
The Act requires that information derive "independent eco-
nomic value"5 1 from the fact of its secrecy to qualify for trade secret
protection. The Restatement defined the trade secret as giving "an
opportunity to obtain an advantage" by virtue of its secrecy. 52
Under the Restatement, protectable information could be production-
related or merely sales-related.5" Trade secret protection extended
to information such as customer lists,54 which contribute to a busi-
ness' overall competitiveness but do not create "economic value" in
the same way that the traditional formula, process, or device creates
"economic value." 55 It seems clear that the Act is not intended to
narrow the common-law definition, and thus "economic value"
must be construed to include both information that increases the
efficiency of distribution as well as production.
In determining whether an alleged trade secret meets the Act's
economic value requirement, the question arises whether the re-
quirement should be read to include information that is useful in
enabling a business to produce or distribute goods or services of
49. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
50. In Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983)
(en banc), the court retained this factor in a case brought under Minnesota's version of
the Act, stating that "the third common law element of trade secret status, that the infor-
mation must have been developed at plaintiffs expense, is not completely eliminated by
the Act." Id. at 901 n. 12. The final common law test for determining whether informa-
tion constitutes a trade secret, namely the ease with which the information legitimately
can be duplicated, finds support in another Maryland statute dealing with trade secrets.
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157F (1988) (feasibility of reverse engineering is expressly
made a primary factor for determining whether a trade secfet interest exists in a given
chemical).
51. MD. CoM. LAw CODE ANN. § Il-1201(e)(1) (1989).
52. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
53. d
54. Id.
55. Customer lists merely are "developed as an incident of the [business or] prac-
tice." Dworkin v. Blumenthal, 77 Md. App. 774, 782, 551 A.2d 947, 950 (1989). As
such, they do not contribute to the end-product or service that the company provides.
Nevertheless, the Dworkin court recognized that customer lists conceivably could be
trade secrets. Id. California was the first state to hold that customer lists were poten-
tially trade secrets under the Act, emphasizing that parties still would have to meet the
tests of economic value and reasonable efforts to protect secrecy on a case-by-case basis.
American Paper & Packaging Prod., Inc. v. Kingan, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1318, 1323-26, 228
Cal. Rptr. 713, 715-16 (1986).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
value (increase efficiency) or whether any information that a compet-
itor would find useful qualifies for protection. Professor Klitzke
opines that the term "economic value" is broad enough to include
"negative" information to the effect that a particular process will
not work.56 The questions become more difficult with respect to
other types of "negative information," such as profit margins and
other internal cost-control information. This information is "valua-
ble" to competitors, usually not because such information makes
them more efficient, but because it can be used as a weapon to wage
price wars and bottleneck supplies to drive other competitors out of
the market.57 Although one may question whether information that
a party seeks for anticompetitive purposes has "economic" value,
the policy behind trade secrets protection weighs in favor of con-
struing the definition to include this type of negative information
because its misappropriation has the greatest potential for harm
both to the victim and to the market as a whole. 58
Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc. ,59 which the Minne-
sota Supreme Court decided under that state's version of the Act,
highlights the practical importance to a plaintiff of identifying al-
leged trade secrets with specificity. In that case, the court held that
"design procedures" and "dimensions" of one of the technologies
at issue were not specific enough to allow the court to find that a
trade secret existed.' This decision suggests that a party must
plead specifically as to the exact process or information at issue as a
protectable trade secret so that the court can "fashion a meaningful
injunction which would not overly restrict competition."'"
The final common-law consideration for determining whether
information constitutes a trade secret is the ease with which the in-
formation can be duplicated legitimately. The Act provides only
that the trade secret not be "readily ascertainable" 6 2-the ease of
56. Klitzke, supra note 5, at 289; see UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1, comment 5, 14
U.L.A. 537, 543 (1980) ("The definition of... trade secret includes information that has
commercial value from a negative viewpoint.").
57. See infra note 59 and accompanying text. One also could imagine cases in which
internal pricing information could be valuable for its own sake, such as when a competi-
tor could make planning, research, and development more efficient.
58. See SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1260-61 (3d Cir. 1985)
(holding that pricing information, including overhead and profit-margin, is properly
protectable as a trade secret).
.59. 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983) (en banc); see supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
60. Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 898.
61. Id
62. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-1201(e)(2) (1989).
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acquisition of the information is not a requirement. Yet, this com-
mon-law test has appeared before in Maryland legislation, 63 and it
therefore is unlikely that the Act's adoption represents a legislative
intent to do away with the test.
III. How SECRET IS SECRET?
To qualify for the Act's protection, information must be "the
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy."'  This provision presents a good example of
the manner in which the Act tracks the common law. Indeed, the
Maryland Court of Appeals in Space Aero established a common-law
view of reasonable secrecy that seems fully consistent with the statu-
tory standard.65 In Space Aero, the defendants argued that the plain-
tiff lost any claim to a trade secret when the plaintiff left open the
factory garage doors,66 allowed guests to visit employees while the
employees assembled the allegedly secret hose,67 and even gave
public demonstrations of the hose-building process to small
groups.68 The court rejected the defendant's arguments and con-
cluded that the creator "took precautions to guard the secrecy of its
process which, under the circumstances, were reasonably suffi-
cient. '  In so deciding, the court reasoned that "[a]bsolute secrecy
is not essential but a substantial element of secrecy must exist so
that there would be difficulty in others properly acquiring the infor-
mation. ' 70 The fact that no other company could duplicate the pro-
cess until the formation of the company that misappropriated the
process showed that the creator successfully maintained secrecy for
many years. 71 Further, the extent of the community's industrial de-
velopment is relevant to whether the creator's precautions are rea-
63. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157F (1988). This statute expressly makes the fea-
sibility of reverse engineering a primary factor for determining whether a trade secret
interest exists in a given chemical. Id.
64. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-1201(e)(2) (1989).
65. 238 Md. 93, 109-13, 208 A.2d 74, 82-83, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965). The
leading case on the secrecy issue is E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431
F.2d 1012, 1015-16 (5th Cir. 1970), in which the court held that the defendant's aerial
photography of the plaintiffs uncompleted methane plant was misappropriation, not
saved by lack of secrecy.
66. 238 Md. at 112, 208 A.2d at 83.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 109-10, 208 A.2d at 82.
71. Id. at 112, 208 A.2d at 83.
1990] 1065
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
sonable, stated the court.72 In Space Aero, the creators' plant resided
in a small, growing community. Therefore, the court reasoned that
when determining the appropriate degree of secrecy, the trade se-
cret holder may consider that "[iln its particular community and en-
vironment . . . too elaborate efforts at concealment would call
attention to what was being concealed, as in Poe's 'Purloined
Letter.' ,,71
The Space Aero court's flexible, fact-oriented approach stands in
contrast to the court's mechanical adherence to the Restatement tests
in Dworkin v. Blumenthal.74 In Dworkin, the Court of Special Appeals
found the fact that dentists in the same practice had not made ef-
forts to keep their patient lists secret from one another, even while
they were associated, to be a relevant, outcome-determinative factor in
a trade secret claim. 7' The court's imposition of an absolute secrecy
requirement, although patterned after the Restatement test that con-
cerned availability of information to employees, clashes with the
reasonable secrecy standard of Space Aero and the Act.76
IV. MISAPPROPRIATION
The question of whether a trade secret exists has been de-
scribed as a question of property, whereas the question of whether a
misappropriation has occurred has been described as one of fiduci-
ary relationships." The Maryland courts, however, have taken a
slightly different view. The Space Aero court adopted Justice Holmes'
72. Id
73. Id at 114, 208 A.2d at 84. This is the majority view at common law, as well as the
rule under the Act. Judge Posner suggests a justification for the view: Sanctioning re-
verse engineering is unlikely to lead to significant efforts at secrecy; on the other hand,
producers would expend resources on secrecy measures if techniques such as aerial pho-
tography were allowed. The expenditures would contribute nothing toward the produc-
tion process and as such would be "socially wasted." R.A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
JUSTICE 254-55 (1983) (discussing E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431
F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970)).
74. 77 Md. App. 774, 551 A.2d 947 (1989); see supra note 19.
75. Id at 782, 551 A.2dat 950.
76. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-1201(e)(2). The absolute secrecy requirement
has appeared in dicta in a few cases, and has been regarded as the less sound view. See
12 BusINESS ORGANIZATIONS, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.07[2] (1983).
77. See, e.g., Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn.
1983) (en banc). In that case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota explicitly referred to the
threshold inquiry of trade secret status as whether the plaintiff has "property rights" in
the trade secret. Id. at 897. The court went on to recognize "that the confidential rela-
tionship is also a prerequisite to an action for misappropriation," and further, that the
property rights aspect should not be separated from the confidential relationship be-
cause they are interdependent. Id
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view that the property concept of trade secrets is of secondary im-
portance to a party's breach of good faith in a confidential
relationship. 78
Under the Restatement view, misappropriation means "disclosure
or use [of the trade secret of another that] constitutes a breach of
confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to
him.",79  The Act's definition of misappropriation is much more
comprehensive.8 1 Under the Act, misappropriation includes disclo-
sure or acquisition of a trade secret by improper means, accident, or
mistake without the holder's consent.8'
While the Act enumerates the improper means,82 the list appar-
ently is not exhaustive.8 5 There are no reported Maryland decisions
78. 238 Md. at 113-14, 208 A.2d at 84. In Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Mas-
land, 244 U.S. 100 (1917), Justice Holmes stated:
The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed
expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law
makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs
have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they
are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The property may be de-
nied but the confidence cannot be .... If there is any disadvantage in the fact
that he knew the plaintiffs' secrets he must take the burden with the good.
Id. at 102.
79. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
80. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 11-1201(c) (1989).
"Misappropriation" means the: (1) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by
a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired
by improper means; or (2) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another with-
out express or implied consent by a person who:
(i) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(ii) At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that
the person's knowledge of the trade secret was:
1. Derived from or through a person who had utilized improper
means to acquire it; 2. Acquired under circumstances giving rise to a
duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or 3. Derived from or
through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(iii) Before a material change of the person's position, knew or had
reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been
acquired by accident or mistake.
Id.
81. See id.
82. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-1201(b). "'Improper means' includes theft,
bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain se-
crecy, or espionage through electronic or other means." Id.
83. "Improper means could include otherwise lawful conduct which is improper
under the circumstances." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, comment 5, 14 U.L.A. 542
(1980). At least one commentator has interpreted this comment to render any unethical
conduct 'improper means.' See Note, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act: The Impact Its Adoption
Would Have on Michigan's Common-Law Protection of Trade Secrets and Proposed Modifications for
Legislative Consideration, 63 U. DET. L. REV. 517 (1986).
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with regard to misappropriation through accident or mistake. By
allowing liability in cases of accident or mistake as well as "improper
means," however, the Act reduces the proof problems that trade se-
cret litigants face. 4
V. REMEDIES UNDER THE AcT
The Act specifically provides for both legal85 and equitable 6
remedies in the event of misappropriation. The equitable remedies
include several innovative means of shaping an injunction. Perhaps
most importantly, the Act gives the courts the power to compel af-
firmative acts to protect a trade secret.8 7
In addition, the Act's provision for the termination of injunc-
tions" embodies the view already held by the Maryland courts, s 9
and requires jurisdictions that previously had allowed punijive per-
manent injunctions to conform to the Act's provisions.' Nonethe-
less, in cases where the Act is not the source of the remedy, the
courts may continue to grant indefinite or permanent injunctions.
For example, the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld an indefinite
injunction in a case in which the party did not prove a trade secret,
but did prove a breach of contract. 9'
There are no reported trade secret cases in Maryland that deal
84. For a discussion of the practical ramifications of this provision, see Note, supra
note 84, at 526.
85. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-1203 (1989).
86. Id. § 11-1202.
87. Id. § 11-1202(d).
88. "Upon application to the court, an injunction shall be terminated when the trade
secret has ceased to exist, but the injunction may be continued for an additional reason-
able period of time in order to eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise would be
derived from the misappropriation." Id. § 11-1202(b) (1989).
89. In Space Aero, the court identified two opposing views on the use of injunctions in
trade secret cases. 238 Md. 93, 123, 208 A.2d 74, 89-90, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843
(1965). The first view would allow the courts to issue permanent injunctions against the
misappropriator. The second view is based on the premise that the injunction is a surro-
gate for the secrecy which the misappropriator destroyed. Once the information be-
comes public, therefore, an injunction would serve only punitive purposes. The Court of
Appeals, like the Act, followed the latter view. Id. at 125, 208 A.2d at 91.
90. See, e.g., Elcor Chem. Corp. v. Agri-Sul, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204, 213 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973) (injunction prohibiting further disclosure was expanded to perpetually en-
join appellees from using the trade secret).
91. Ruhl v. F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118, 128, 225 A.2d 288, 293
(1967). The Court of Appeals indicated its willingness to uphold indefinite injunctions
when it concluded that a trade secret did not exist, but concluded that an implied con-
tractual obligation did exist. Id. at 127, 225 A.2d at 291. The Act is inapplicable to any
case that involves contractual remedies. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 11-1207(b)(i)
(1989).
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with specific formulae for the calculation of money damages, or an
award of attorney fees under the Act.92 The Act, however, provides
for both.9" Under the Act, courts have the power to award exem-
plary damages 9' and damages based on actual loss, unjust enrich-
ment, or reasonable royalties for the misappropriator's use of the
trade secret. 95
VI. RELATION TO OTHER STATUTORY PROVISIONS
By its terms, the Act does not affect "[c]riminal remedies,
whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret. "96
There are, in fact, two statutory routes to criminal liability for such
misappropriation. First, the consolidated theft statute defines trade
secrets as property subject to theft.97 In that context, there also is a
presumption established by the code that "[iln cases of theft of a
trade secret .... the defendant rightfully knew the trade secret or...
it was available to him from a source other than the owner of the
trade secret."9" A second, more obscure manner of reaching crimi-
nal liability is the apparent strict liability misdemeanor that covers
use or revelation of a trade secret in connection with poultry
inspection."
CONCLUSION
The Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act expands the State's
existing common-law doctrine of trade secrets protection. The Act
essentially leaves undisturbed the common-law structure and its re-
lation to other types of intellectual property law. The Act's defini-
tion of trade secrets permits the courts to provide remedies for the
misappropriation of a wider variety of information, notably by elimi-
nating the common-law requirements of "present economic value"
and "use in business." Further, the Act broadens the concept of
92. But see Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383 (D. Md.
1963), which awarded the plaintiff the profits that the defendant made by using one of
the plaintiffs trade secrets. The Act would support a similar measure of damages.
93. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 11-1203, -1204 (1989).
94. Id. § 11-1203(d).
95. Id. § 11-1203(b), (c).
96. Id. § 11-1207(b)(iii).
97. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 340(c)(4) (1987). While the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act itself never refers to trade secrets as "property," dicta in older Maryland cases sup-
ports this view. See Fleishmann v. Mercantile Trust, 192 Md. 680, 684, 65 A.2d 182, 183
(1949). No cases reported in Maryland deal with a criminal conviction for theft of a
trade secret.
98. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 343(c)(4) (1987).
99. See MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 4-218(5), -226 (1985).
1990] 1069
1070 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 49:1056
misappropriation to include accident and mistake. Both legal and
equitable remedies expressly made available by the Act are greater
in number and scope than those that the Maryland courts have rec-
ognized to date. By joining what is now a majority of states that
operate under the Act, Maryland also has lent greater weight to the
trade secrets law of other jurisdictions that have adopted the Act.
This no doubt will play an important role in future litigation.
PETER B. SWANN
